Abstract: This paper investigates how welfare losses for facing risks change as the risk environment of the decision-maker is altered. To that aim, we define the risk apportionment of order n (RA-n) utility premium as a measure of pain associated with facing the passage from one risk to a riskier one. Changes in risks are expressed through the concept of stochastic dominance of order n. Three configurations of risk exposures are considered. The paper first shows how the RA-n utility premium is modified when initial wealth becomes riskier. Second, the paper provides conditions on individual preferences for superadditivity of the RA-n utility premium. Third, the paper investigates welfare changes of merging increases in risks. These results offer new interpretations of the sign of higher derivatives of the utility function.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of how the presence of multiple risks modify individual behaviour in the face of another risk has been leading to a prolific literature during the last decades.
1 Most of these studies use monetary measures to analyze behaviour towards risk, the most wellknown being the risk premium and the willingness to pay. More recently, a few papers have used non-monetary measures to provide new behavioural results in the face of risks. In particular, the concept of utility premium originally introduced by Friedman and Savage (1948) has regained interest. For instance, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) rely on the utility premium to propose a unified approach to explain the meaning of the signs of the successive derivatives of the utility function. also reexamine the properties of the utility premium and explain the relevance of this tool for decision making. Recently, Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) and Courbage and Rey (2010) used non-monetary measures of prudence and temperance to extract behavioural results. Such non-monetary measures not only offer alternative tools to analyse the individual loss of welfare due to the presence of risks, but also allow for much simpler conditions on individual preferences to predict behaviour towards risks. An issue of importance when dealing with measures of risks is how these measures react to a riskier environment. In particular, knowing how welfare losses of facing increases in risks change as a function of the number of risk exposures offers crucial knowledge on how individuals react to riskier environment. To address these issues, this paper defines the risk apportionment of order n (RA-n) utility premium as a measure of pain associated with facing the passage from one risk to a worse one. Changes in risks are expressed through the specific concept of stochastic dominance of order n.
The paper first shows how the RA-n utility premium is modified when individual wealth becomes riskier. It makes it possible to generalise earlier results on the topic, and in particular those of Courbage and Rey (2010) . Second, the paper provides conditions on individual preferences for superadditivity and subadditivity of the RA-n utility premium. A measure is said to be superadditive or convex in the number of risks if the measured value of two risks is superior to the sum of the values of each risk; the opposite holding for subadditivity. Superadditivity/subadditivity sheds light on whether risks are self-aggravating for individuals. For instance, Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2001) show that risk vulnerability (see Gollier and Pratt, 1996) is a sufficient condition for superadditivity of the risk premium. The concept of subadditivity of risks measures has also been popularised through the definition of coherent risk measures defined by Artzner et al. (1999) .
Third, the paper uses the RA-n utility premium to investigate a related but different issue, i.e. whether welfare loss changes when increases in risks are merged instead of facing them separately. This makes it possible to extend the recent results of Ebert et al. (2017) on mutual aggravation of risk changes in terms of mutual improvements of risk changes.
The paper shows that the degree of pain due to facing an increased risk grows when the initial wealth becomes riskier if the signs of the successive derivatives of the utility function alternate in signs, i.e. when preferences exhibit mixed risk-aversion as defined by Caballé and Pomansky (1996) . It also shows that mixed risk aversion of order 4 is sufficient for superadditivity of the RA-n utility premium. Finally, mixed risk-aversion is also shown to drive welfare changes of merging increases in risks. The results of this paper therefore provide new interpretations of the sign of higher derivatives of the utility function.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the benchmark model for non-monetary measures of risk and in particular the RA-n utility premium. Section 3 investigates the effect of riskier initial wealth on the RA-n utility premium. Section 4 addresses the conditions on individuals preferences for superadditivity/subadditivity of non-monetary measures of risks. Section 5 deals with welfare changes of merging increases in risks and provides a link with the work of Ebert et al. (2017) . Section 6 finally offers a short conclusion.
THE BENCHMARK MODEL

Non-monetary measures in the face of risks
Non-monetary measures in the face of risks stem from the work of Friedman and Savage (1948) who used expected utility theory to define risk aversion and introduced two ways for its measure. The two measures reflect the subjective cost of risk for a risk averter.
Let an individual's final wealth be represented by x +˜ where x (x > 0) denotes the initial wealth of the individual and˜ is a zero-mean random variable 2 . The first measure of risk aversion in the face of the risk˜ at wealth level x is a monetary measure, the risk premium π(x,˜ ), and is such that:
where u denotes the individual's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (with u (x) ≥ 0 ∀x) and E denotes the expectation operator. π(x,˜ ) is the amount of money that the agent is ready to pay to get rid of the zero-mean risk . π(x,˜ ) ≥ 0 if and only if the individual is risk-averse (u (x) ≤ 0 ∀x).
The second one is a non-monetary measure of risk aversion, the utility premium, w A (x,˜ ):
w A (x, ε) measures the degree of "pain" associated with facing the risk ε, where pain is measured by the loss in expected utility from adding the risk ε to wealth x. From Jensen's inequality, w A (x) ≥ 0 if and only if u (x) ≤ 0 ∀x 3 .
Prudence is known as preference for a zero-mean risk in the wealthier state of nature. The prudence utility premium as introduced by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) , denoted w P (x, ε), measures the increase in pain of facing the risk ε in the presence of a sure loss l > 0. This is defined as follows:
which is equivalent to:
Naturally, w P (x, ε) ≥ 0 if and only if u ≥ 0 4 .
Temperance is known as preference for disaggregation of two independent zero-mean risks. The temperance utility premium as introduced by Courbage and Rey (2010) , denoted w T (x, ε), measures the increase in pain of facing the risk ε in the presence of an independent zero-mean riskθ. It writes as follows:
w T (x, ε) ≥ 0 if and only if u (4) ≤ 0 5 . Courbage and Rey (2010) suggested an extension of these measures to higher orders defining the utility premium by iteration following Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) . Denoting w (2) (x, ε) the Friedman and Savage (1948) utility premium of Eq. (2), we can proceed from their remark by defining for all n even and n ≥ 2:
3 We assume throughout this article that the utility function u is nth differentiable. As it is usual, we assume that the derivative of order k (∀k ≥ 1), denoted u (k) (x), has a constant sign in the domain of u:
To simplify notations we will only write u (k) ≥ 0 or u (k) ≤ 0. 4 To see this note that, using Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , Eq. (3) is positive by preference for disaggregation of harms by a prudent individual. Now, prudence defined in this way is equivalent to a positive third derivative of the utility function, by Jensen's inequality.
5 Note that Eq. (5) is positive iff the individual is temperant by the expected utility equivalence of the definition of temperance in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) . Now, we see from Eq. (6) that w T ≥ 0 is equivalent to w A is convex by Jensen's inequality. From the definition of w A in Eq. (2) w A is convex iff u is concave, which is equivalent to u (4) ≤ 0 by Jensen's inequality again.
with l > 0 and
whereθ n is an independent random variable (i.e. random variables˜ ,θ 2 ,θ 4 ,θ 6 , etc, are mutually independent) and such that E(θ n ) = 0. As an illustration, when n = 2, w (n+1) (x,˜ ) corresponds to the prudence utility premium, w P (x,˜ ), and w (n+2) (x,˜ ) corresponds to the temperance utility premium, w T (x,˜ ), as defined by equations (4) and (6).
The RA-n utility premium
While Courbage and Rey (2010) suggested to define utility premia of higher orders by iteration of the previous premia of lower orders and in the context of specific lotteries, in this section we present a very general way to define the utility premium at higher orders using the concept of stochastic dominance of order n.
Let's consider two risky situations: a first situation represented by the random variable Y 1 and a second one represented by the random variable X 1 . We assume that X 1 and Y 1 are independent, and that Y 1 dominates X 1 via nth-order stochastic dominance (
The concept of nth-order stochastic dominance is defined as follows 6 . Consider Y 1
and X 1 with F and G, respectively, their two cumulative distribution functions of wealth, defined over a probability support contained within the interval [a, b] .
When the n − 1 moments of X 1 and Y 1 are equals, nth-order stochastic dominance coincides with the Ekern's (1980) concept of increase in nth-order risk (X 1 n Y 1 ). Ekern's (1980) definition includes the case of mean-preserving increase in risk of Rothshild and Stiglitz (1970) as well as of increase in downside risk defined by Menezes et al. (1980) as, respectively, a second-degree and a third-degree increase in risk.
Our objective is to define the non-monetary measure of the cost of facing the risk transition e.g. the passage from Y 1 to X 1 (with X 1 n−SD Y 1 ). Let's define the function w as follows 7 :
The function w(x; Y 1 , X 1 ) measures the degree of pain associated with facing the passage from the risk Y 1 to the less favorable one, X 1 , when the decision-maker's initial wealth is x. We formulate the following definition.
Definition. Given two independent risks, Y 1 and
] is named the "risk apportionment of order n utility premium", also denoted the RA-n utility premium. It measures the degree of pain due to the aggravating nth-order stochastic dominance risk.
From Ingersoll (1987) , we observe that w(x; Y 1 , X 1 ) ≥ 0 if and only if (−1)
positive and all even derivatives of u are negative. Following Brockett and Golden (1987) and according to Caballé and Pomansky (1996) , an individual with such a utility function is said to be mixed risk-averse. Hence, for all order n, the RA-n utility premium of a mixed risk averse agent is always positive. In other words, such an individual always incurs a pain when facing the passage from the risk Y 1 to a less favorable one X 1 dominated via nth-order stochastic dominance. We will label a utility function u as mixed risk-averse of order n if it verifies (−1)
Particular cases of the RA-n utility premium are the various premia defined in the previous section for which Y 1 dominates X 1 via nth-order Ekern's dominance (X 1 n Y 1 ). Indeed, following following Ekern (1980) 
For instance, when Y 1 = 0 and X 1 is a zero-mean background risk,
It is the utility premium introduced by Friedman and Savage (1948) to define the nonmonetary risk aversion measure: w(x; 0,˜ ) ≥ 0 if and only if the individual is risk-averse (u ≤ 0). When Y 1 and X 1 are defined as equiprobable lotteries describing an increase in downside risk (Menezes et al. (1980) ):
] with l > 0 and E(˜ ) = 0, the function w writes as
where w P (x,˜ ) is the prudence utility premium defined by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) ], withθ and˜ independent and zero mean random variables (E(θ) = E(˜ ) = 0), the function w writes as
where
corresponds to the temperance utility premium defined by Courbage and Rey (2010) which is positive if and only if u (4) ≤ 0.
RA-n UTILITY PREMIUM AND CHANGES IN RISKS
As Courbage and Rey (2010) , we can investigate, in the more general context of the RA-n utility premium, how this measure reacts to the introduction on wealth of a sure loss (−l with l > 0) or a zero-mean background risk (˜ with E(˜ ) = 0). As intuition suggests, the pain increases in both cases under usual conditions on the signs of higherorders derivatives of the utility function. Indeed, considering the impact of a sure loss and a background risk on the RA-n utility premium, we obtain:
These results are rather easy to obtain. Eq. (10) rewrites as
. Using Theorem 3 of , we obtain that this inequality holds iff (−1) (k+1) u (k) ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . , n + 1. In the same vein,
Using , we obtain that this inequality holds iff (−1)
Eqs. (10) and (11) have intuitive explanations. If we consider a decision-maker with a mixed risk-averse utility function of order n + 2, Eqs. (10) and (11) respectively mean that the RA-N utility premium (∀N ≤ n + 1) is vulnerable to a sure loss, and that the RA-N utility premium (∀N ≤ n) is vulnerable to a zero-mean background risk.
Such analysis can be extended to a more general context by investigating the degree of pain associated with facing the passage from Y 1 to X 1 when the wealth level becomes riskier. A riskier wealth corresponds to the random wealth level, initially equal to x + Y 2 , becoming x+X 2 where Y 2 dominates X 2 via sth-order stochastic dominance (X 2 s−SD Y 2 with X 2 and Y 2 being independent random variables). The degree of pain associated with facing the passage from Y 1 to X 1 when the wealth level becomes riskier is defined by the following expression 8 :
A positive sign of (12) means that the pain facing the passage from Y 1 to X 1 increases when the wealth level becomes riskier. We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider mutually independent random variables X 1 , Y 1 , X 2 , and Y 2 , such that X 1 n−SD Y 1 and
Proof. Using the definition of w, w( , this last expression is equivalent to (−1) (1+k) u (k) ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n + s.
Proposition 1 can be interpreted in a similar way as Eqs. (10) and (11). If we consider a decision-maker with a mixed risk-averse utility function of order n + s, Proposition 1 means that the RA-N utility premium (∀N ≤ n−s) is vulnerable to a detrimental change of order s in the background risk.
In order to provide a different interpretation of the results, we restrict our attention on the special case of Ekern dominance as often done in the literature. The advantage of this dominance rule is that the positive sign of the RA-n utility premium depends only on the sign of the nth derivative of u. Indeed, according to Ekern (1980) , w(x; Y 1 , X 1 ) ≥ 0 if and only if (−1) (1+n) u (n) ≥ 0, i.e. risk apportionment of order n holds. From Proposition 1, we can extrapolate the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The four following items are equivalent:
(1) risk apportionment of order n holds, (2) the pain due to misaportionment of order (n − 1) is vulnerable to a sure loss, (3) the pain due to misaportionment of order (n − 2) is vulnerable to a zero-mean background risk, (4) the pain due to misaportionment of order (n − s) is vulnerable to an increase in risk of order s.
Note that item (2) also means that the RA-n-1 utility premium is decreasing in the wealth level x and item (3) means that the RA-n-2 utility premium is convex in x. This is rather intuitive as when the individual gets richer the pain of facing increases in risks is reduced as he can deal with them more easily, but this reduction in pain diminishes as the individual's wealth increases.
Corollary 1 offers an alternative interpretation of the sign of the utility function norder derivative (u (n) ) which can be easily understood and remembered, without reference to any specific decision problem. For instance in the case of the utility premium for which Y 1 = 0 and X 1 =˜ (X 1 2 Y 1 ), Corollary 1 tells us that the degree of pain of facing the risk˜ increases when initial wealth becomes risky (i.e. when any zero-mean risk X 2 is added to initial wealth) for a temperant individual. In the same way, in the case of the prudence premium, for which X 1 represents an increase in downside risk over Y 1 (X 1 3 Y 1 ), Corollary 1 tells us that the degree of pain of facing an increase in downside risk increases when initial wealth becomes risky for an individual featuring edginess 9 .
SUPERADDITIVITY OF THE RA-n UTILITY PREMIUM
An issue of importance when dealing with measures of risks is that of superadditivity or subadditivity of these measures. From the risk theory literature (see for example Buhlmann (1985) or Gerber and Goovaerts (1981) ), it is well-known that financial risks are very often self-aggravating. This would suggest that the cost of risk for two independent risks should be greater than the sum of costs of the two risks taken in isolation. If it were the case, the cost of risk would be superadditive. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2001) examine this issue when the cost of risk is defined in terms of risk premium. They show that the risk premium is superadditive if risk aversion is risk vulnerable 10 .
We first address the issue of superadditivity when the cost of risk is defined in nonmonetary terms through the concept of the Friedman-Savage utility premium. The definition of superadditivity is the following. A real-valued function f is superadditive if f (n 1 + n 2 ) is larger than f (n 1 ) + f (n 2 ) for all n 1 > 0 and n 2 > 0. The opposite inequality holding true for subadditivity. We show that the Friedman-Savage utility premium is superadditive for all temperant decision-makers. This gives the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider mutually independent zero-mean risks X 1 and X 2 . Then the Friedman-Savage utility premium is superadditive (i.e. w(x; 0, X 1 + X 2 ) ≥ w(x; 0, X 1 ) + w(x; 0, X 2 )) for all utility functions u such that u (4) ≤ 0.
Proof. Superadditivity of the Friedman-Savage utility premium rewrites as u( , this inequality is equivalent to w T ≥ 0, i.e. u (4) ≤ 0 since the introduction of a zero-mean risk X i (i = 1, 2) is an increase in risk of order 2 in the sense of Ekern.
Proposition 2 states that the pain of facing two risks simultaneously is higher than the sum of the pains of facing each risk separately for a temperant individual. Let's make two remarks. First, while risk vulnerability is required for monetary measures of risk to be superadditive, for which temperance is only a necessary condition, temperance here is 9 The concept of edginess, i.e. u (5) ≥ 0, was introduced by Lajeri-Chaherli (2004) to explain the effects of background risks on precautionary savings.
10 Risk vulnerability means that risk aversion increases with the presence of an independent background risk (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) . Sufficient and necessary conditions on the utility function to have risk vulnerability are quite complex. A necessary condition for risk vulnerability is u (4) ≤ 0.
sufficient to obtain superadditivity in the case of the Fiedman-Savage utility premium. Second, obviously the superadditivity of the Friedman-Savage utility premium holds for all "mixed risk-averse of order 4" decision-makers. Extending superadditivity to the RA-n utility premium allows us to consider the more following general context. Instead of considering the passage from 0 to X i (i = 1, 2), we consider the passage from a risky situation Y to a less favorable one X i (i = 1, 2). The superadditivity to the RA-n utility premium writes as
where Y , X 1 and X 2 are zero-mean mutually independent random variables. Subadditivity of the utility premium corresponds naturally to the opposite inequalities. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Consider mutually independent zero-mean risks, X 1 , X 2 and Y . Then the RA-n utility premium is superadditive (i.e. w(x; Y, X 1 + X 2 ) ≥ w(x; Y, X 1 ) + w(x; Y, X 2 )) for all utility functions u such that u ≤ 0 and u (4) ≤ 0 .
According to Proposition 3, the pain of facing a change in two risks simultaneously is higher than the sum of the pains of facing two changes in risk separately for all risk-averse and temperant decision-makers. Obviously the result holds for all "mixed risk-averse of order 4" decision-makers. Note that Proposition 2 holds for all temperant decision makers i.e. for all u such that u (4) ≤ 0 whatever the sign of other lower order derivatives contrary to Proposition 3 that imposes risk aversion (u ≤ 0). Risk aversion is not required in the case of the Savage-Friedman utility premium because assuming Y = 0 implies that superadditivity rewrites equivalently as preference for harms disaggregation (Eeckhoudt et al. (2009)). In Proposition 3 (where Y is a zero-mean independent risk) it is no longer the case. Imposing risk aversion ensures that
, and then coupled with u (4) ≤ 0 is sufficient to obtain superadditivity. In the case of a risk lover,
. Note that Proposition 3 holds whatever the nature of the change in risk between Y and respectively X 1 and X 2 . Indeed, for any stochastic dominance levels n and s such that X 1 n−SD Y and X 2 s−SD Y , Proposition 3 holds.
MERGING CHANGES IN RISKS
While the previous section analyzes superadditivity of the RA-n utility premium, this section addresses merging properties.
To do so, we consider a change in risk as the passage from Y 1 to X 1 and from Y 2 to X 2 with X 1 n−SD Y 1 and X 2 s−SD Y 2 where risks Y 1 , Y 2 , X 1 and X 2 are mutually independent and where Y 1 and Y 2 are zero-mean risks. We wonder under which conditions on the utility function u the non monetary cost of the total change in risk (passage from (Y 1 + Y 2 ) to (X 1 + X 2 )) is larger than the sum of the non-monetary cost of each change in risk (passage from Y 1 to X 1 and simultaneously passage from Y 2 to X 2 ). More formally, we wonder what properties of u ensure the following inequality:
The following proposition provides conditions for such a comparison.
Proposition 4. Consider mutually independent random variables X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 and Y 2 , such that
Proof. Since E(Y 1 ) = 0 we have Y 1 2 0. Given that X 2 s Y 2 and applying 
Analogously, since E(Y 2 ) = 0 we have Y 2 2 0. Given that X 1 n Y 1 and applying 
Consequently, if u is such that (−1) (1+k) u (k) ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . , n + s, ∀n ≥ 2, ∀s ≥ 2 then the following inequality holds:
that ends the proof.
Proposition 4 refers to a merging property. It means that welfare is reduced by merging changes in risks instead of facing them separately, i.e. the welfare loss of both increases in risks taken together is larger than the sum of welfare losses from assuming each increase in risk separately.
Note that when Y 1 = Y 2 = 0 (that implies considering n = s = 2) and E(X 1 ) = E(X 2 ) = 0, the superadditivity property of the Friedman-Savage utility premium coincides with this merging property. Indeed inequality (14) rewrites as w(x; 0, X 1 + X 2 ) ≥ w(x; 0, X 1 ) + w(x; 0, X 2 ) which is precisely the inequality describing the superadditivity of the Friedman-Savage utility premium in Proposition 2. Hence, superadditivity of the Friedman-Savage utility premium means that welfare is reduced by merging increases in risks instead of facing them separately. This result is reminiscent of Samuelson (1963) who points out that riskaverters prefer to subdivide risks instead of facing them in one shot. Similarly, Eeckhoudt et al. (1991) show that risk-averters reduce their demand for insurance with a positive loading when the total property at risk is scattered on smaller independent units.
In the context described by Proposition 4, the two risk sets (Y 1 , X 1 ) and (Y 2 , X 2 ) are considered in isolation. In Eq. (14), on the RHS, there is no link between (Y 1 , X 1 ) on one hand and (Y 2 , X 2 ) on the other hand. Nevertheless, these two risk sets are present in the DM's environment. A change of perspective arises if we take this fact into account, and if we consider that risk 2 is a background risk for the management of risk 1, and inversely. Interestingly, it turns out that this change of perspective reverses the result. For example, in the case of the Friedman-Savage utility premium, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Given mutually independent zero-mean random variables, X 1 and X 2 , the Friedman-Savage utility premium verifies w(x; 0, X 1 + X 2 ) ≤ w(x + X 2 ; 0, X 1 ) + w(x + X 1 ; 0, X 2 ) for all utility functions u such that u (4) ≤ 0.
Proof. The inequality w(x; 0,
Following theorem, this inequality holds for all utility function u verifying u (4) ≤ 0.
Proposition 5 means that the welfare loss of facing the total increase in risk (passage from 0 to (X 1 + X 2 )) is smaller than the welfare loss of facing the first increase in risk (passage from 0 to X 1 ) when the second risk X 2 is considered as a background risk (i.e. a risk that impacts the wealth level x) plus the welfare loss of facing the second increase in risk (passage from 0 to X 2 ) when the first X 1 is considered as a background risk. The result can also be generalized, yielding the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Consider mutually independent random variables X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , and Y 2 such that X 1 n−SD Y 1 and X 2 s−SD Y 2 . Then the two following items (a) and (b) hold for all utility functions u such that (−1) (1+k) u (k) ≥ 0 ∀k = 1, . . . , n + s:
Proof. Item (a) rewrites as:
i.e. the same inequality as the one of item (a).
Item (a) is the generalization of Proposition 5 (where Y 1 = Y 2 = 0, n = s = 2 and E(X 1 ) = E(X 2 ) = 0). But in this general case, background risks can also be Y 1 and Y 2 that provides item (b). Note also that in the case where Y 1 = Y 2 = 0, item (b) rewrites as w(x; 0, X 1 + X 2 ) ≥ w(x; 0, X 1 ) + w(x; 0, X 2 ) that is the result of Proposition 2.
The intuitive interpretation of Proposition 6 is the following. The difference between items (a) and (b) arises from background risk considerations on the RHS. In item (a), the background risks taken into account are the worse risks X 1 and X 2 while they are the better ones Y 1 and Y 2 in item (b). In item (a), the decision-maker is aware that risk Y 2 will be replaced by risk X 2 when she feels the loss of welfare from facing the risk X 1 instead of Y 1 . In item (b), the decision-maker is blind to this risk substitution. She feels a reduced loss from the sum of individual risk substitutions because she ignores that risk Y 2 will be replaced by risk X 2 when dealing with risk 1, and she ignores that risk Y 1 will be replaced by risk X 1 when dealing with risk 2. In this sense, item (a) reflects a kind of rational expectations, whereas item (b) reflects blindness.
It should also be stressed that following Ebert et al. (2017) , item (b) of Proposition 6 can have another interpretation in terms of mutual aggravation of risks changes. Using the perspective of these authors, we show that item (a) can also be interpreted in terms of mutual improvement of risks changes.
To reach such conclusion, we have to consider the following property of the RA-n utility premium that stands from the fact that risks are additive: Property 1. Given mutually independent random variables, X 1 , Y 1 and Z. Then
We first show that the RA-n utility premium increases when the decision-maker faces a riskier wealth under mixed risk aversion. We then turn to the issue of deciding whether the RA-n utility premium is subadditive or superadditive, i.e., deciding whether the cost of an increase in several risks faced jointly is smaller or larger than the sum of these increases in risks faced independently. We obtain that the Friedman-Savage utility premium for an individual with no initial risk is superadditive if the fourth derivative of the utility function is negative (the decision-maker is temperant). We further show that the more general RA-n utility premium is superadditive if the decision-maker is mixed risk averse of order 4. We finally address a related but different issue which is whether it is valuable to merge risks instead of facing them in separate entities. Our results show that an individual whose preferences are mixed-risk averse will feel more pain from merging increases in risk than from facing them in separate entities. However, the result is reversed if risks in separate entities are considered as background risks of each other, and if the individual is aware that both risks will deteriorate. Links with the concept of mutual aggravation of risks introduced by Ebert et al. (2017) are also provided.
The results in this paper provide new interpretations of the sign of higher derivatives of the utility function. As all commonly used utility functions in economic theory, with the first derivative being positive and the second one being negative, exhibit mixed risk aversion, our results then apply to most individuals facing a deterioration in their risk environment.
